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PRODUCTS LIABILITY—CONFLICT PREEMPTION:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DENIES
PREEMPTION DEFENSE FOR DRUG MANUFACTURERS
USING FDA-APPROVED WARNING LABELS
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009)
ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court held a plaintiff’s defective warning
claims were not preempted by federal law or the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) regulations. Part I of this article provides the factual background in which the plaintiff’s arm was amputated after she was given an
injection of Phenergan, a drug manufactured by Wyeth, and developed
gangrene. The plaintiff brought defective warning claims against Wyeth in
a Vermont state court. Wyeth’s defense was that federal laws and regulations preempted the plaintiff’s claims due to conflict preemption because,
Wyeth argued, state tort suits would conflict with the purposes and
objectives of federal laws and regulations, and state tort suits made it
impossible to comply with both federal and state regulations. The jury
returned verdicts against Wyeth, which were upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Part II gives a brief summary of the history of FDA regulations and
preemption principles prior to Wyeth v. Levine. Part III analyzes the
majority and minority opinions of the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine.
Finally, Part IV outlines the impact of the Wyeth v. Levine opinion on
subsequent court opinions.

406

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:405

I.

FACTS ........................................................................................ 407

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND .......................................................... 408
A. FDA REGULATION EVOLUTION ........................................... 409
1. Objectives of the FDCA.................................................. 409
2. The FDA’s Changing Opinion ....................................... 410
B. GENERAL PREEMPTION ........................................................ 411
C. IMPLIED CONFLICT PREEMPTION ......................................... 412
1. Congressional Intent ...................................................... 412
2. Federal Agency Authority .............................................. 413
3. Savings Clauses.............................................................. 414
4. Presumption Against Preemption................................... 415

III.

ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 415
A. MAJORITY OPINION ............................................................. 416
1. The Cornerstones of Preemption.................................... 417
2. Conflict Preemption Based Upon Impossibility ............. 418
3. Conflict Based on Congressional Purposes
and Objectives ................................................................ 420
4. The State Tort Suit Advantage Over
Federal Regulation......................................................... 422
B. JUSTICE BREYER’S CONCURRENCE ..................................... 423
C. JUSTICE THOMAS’S CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT ...... 424
D. JUSTICE ALITO’S DISSENT ................................................... 425

IV.

IMPACT...................................................................................... 426
A. IMPACT ON SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS .................................. 428
B. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA LAW ....................................... 433

V.

CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 434

2010]
I.

CASE COMMENT

407

FACTS

In 2006, the Vermont Supreme Court held Federal Drug Administration (FDA) label requirements were only minimum requirements, a drug
manufacturer could create stronger warnings without prior FDA approval,
and, consequently, a jury verdict finding a drug manufacturer liable on a
failure to warn claim was not preempted.1 The United States Supreme
Court upheld the Vermont state court decision in Wyeth v. Levine,2 holding
FDA approval of the drug Phenergan’s warning label did not preempt a
state tort suit.3 Phenergan’s manufacturer, Wyeth, previously submitted a
revised label in 1988 in response to the FDA’s request for different warnings concerning the risk of Phenergan, an irritant, coming into contact with
arterial blood.4 The FDA did not respond to the proposed revisions about
intra-arterial injections until 1996 and simply instructed Wyeth to “retain
verbiage in current label.”5 Wyeth argued, in Wyeth v. Levine, that FDA
approval and the mandate to retain the warning label on Phenergan meant
any state tort suit based on the adequacy of the warning label would be
preempted and, therefore, dismissed.6 The argument was that preemption
was implicated because the FDA found the warning safe and effective, but a
jury verdict ultimately deemed the same label unreasonably dangerous.7
The plaintiff, Diana Levine, developed gangrene and suffered amputation of her right arm after she was given Phenergan for relief from nausea
due to a migraine.8 Phenergan could be administered intra-muscularly or
intravenously.9 The two intravenous methods included IV-drip and IVpush.10 IV-drip was a slower method, where the drug and saline solution
were in a hanging bag and flowed through a catheter into the patient’s
1. See generally Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 VT 107, 183 Vt. 76, 944 A.2d 179.
2. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). The author will abbreviate the case as Levine because Wyeth has
been a party in several cases cited in this article.
3. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1192. The warning stated, “extreme care should be exercised to avoid” injection of
Phenergan into arterial blood. Levine, 2006 VT 107, ¶ 4 n.1, 183 Vt. 76, 944 A.2d 179. The
warning label further stated reports “suggest” gangrene would be likely if Phenergan came into
contact with arterial blood. Id. Unintended arterial placement of the needle was “suspect” in these
reports. Id. The warning label advised the preferable administration method was to inject
Phenergan “through the tubing of an intravenous infusion set.” Id.
6. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249).
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19, Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249).
8. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
9. Id. Intramuscular administration is a direct injection into muscular tissue and does not
include the risk of Phenergan coming into contact with arterial blood. WESTGROUP, AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE PROOF OF FACTS 119 (3d ed. 2002).
10. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
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vein.11 IV-push was a direct injection into the vein.12 The risk of gangrene
due to Phenergan’s contact with arterial blood was always present and
could not be eliminated during IV-push because the needle could either hit
an artery, or Phenergan could escape into the vein.13 These risks were
almost non-existent with the IV-drip method.14
Plaintiff Levine sued the drug manufacturer, Wyeth, under both negligence and strict liability theories in Vermont state court, claiming damages
due to pain and suffering, medical expenses, and loss of livelihood as a professional musician.15 Wyeth filed a motion for summary judgment based
on the preemption defense, arguing Wyeth was required to comply solely
with the FDA-approved labeling.16 The Vermont Superior Court rejected
Wyeth’s motion and determined the FDA had not “specifically disallowed”
any stronger language.17 The jury found Wyeth negligent, declared
Phenergan a defective product because of its warning label, and awarded
Levine $7.4 million.18 The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed.19 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of “whether
the FDA’s drug labeling judgments preempt state law product liability
claims premised on the theory that different labeling judgments were
necessary to make drugs reasonably safe for use” and affirmed the rulings
and verdicts from the lower courts.20
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Realizing the significance of the analysis and decision in Wyeth v.
Levine requires an examination of the history of FDA regulation and conflict preemption. Pre-Levine confusion was created largely by evolving
FDA regulations and changing FDA opinions.21 Preemption is clearly provided for in the Supremacy Clause.22 Preemption jurisprudence includes
three levels of preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1192.
14. Id. The solution will not flow into an artery or surrounding tissue if the catheter is not in
a vein. Id.
15. Id. at 1191.
16. Id. at 1192.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1193.
19. Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 VT 107, ¶ 5, 183 Vt. 76, 944 A.2d 179 (rejecting Wyeth’s claim
that the trial court failed in dismissing Levine’s inadequate label claim on preemption grounds and
also affirming the damages provisions).
20. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1193, 1204.
21. See id. at 1200-03.
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
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implied conflict preemption.23 Wyeth’s defense in Wyeth v. Levine was that
Levine’s state claim was preempted by federal regulations because of conflict preemption.24 Conflict preemption is controversial due to the uncertainty of Congressional intent in creating regulations, varying levels of
authority granted to numerous federal agencies, and changing principles of
important conflict preemption concepts.25
A. FDA REGULATION EVOLUTION
Two federal bodies are responsible for the regulations at issue: (1)
Congress is responsible for creating and amending the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA);26 and (2) The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) is responsible for implementing regulations.27 Prior to the FDA and
the FDCA, state tort suits were the only protection afforded to consumers.28
The FDA regulates a field involving health and safety—a position traditionally occupied by states—out of necessity for greater consumer safety.29
1.

Objectives of the FDCA

Congress created the FDCA in the 1930s due to the prevalence of unsafe drugs and fraudulent marketing of drugs.30 The initial Act required
manufacturers to submit new drug applications, reports, and proposed labels
to the FDA in order to gain the requisite premarket approval of drugs and
their labels.31 The FDA could reject a drug’s entrance onto the market if
the FDA determined a drug was not safe for use as labeled.32 In the original
provisions of the FDCA, the FDA had to prove a drug was unsafe in order
to keep that drug off the market.33 In 1962, Congress shifted the burden of
23. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985). Express preemption occurs when Congress expressly states a federal law preempts a state
law. Id. Field preemption occurs where federal regulation is so extensive in an area of law there is
no room left for state law in the same area. Id. Implied conflict preemption occurs where there is
an actual conflict between federal and state law because it is physically impossible to comply with
both or because “state law stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
Id.
24. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1193.
25. See id. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating the majority opinion “turned yesterday’s
dissent into today’s majority opinion.”)
26. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938).
27. See generally Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195-1204 (explaining the role of the FDA).
28. Id. at 1195.
29. Id. at 1194-95. Congress’s first act was the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, which
prohibited the manufacturer and shipment of misbranded or tainted drugs and was meant to
supplement state regulations and common law liability. Id. at 1195.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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proof regarding a drug’s safety and effectiveness from the FDA to the
manufacturer.34 The manufacturer was required to prove the drug was safe
for use according to the drug label and instructions.35 Congress also added
a “savings clause,”36 whereby a state law would be invalidated if there was
a “direct and positive conflict” with the FDCA.37
The FDCA allows manufacturers to change a drug’s label in two
ways.38 First, a drug manufacturer can file a supplemental application with
the FDA and change the label upon FDA approval.39 Second, a manufacturer can change a drug’s label before gaining FDA approval if
necessary to “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or
adverse reaction . . .” or to “add or strengthen an instruction about dosage
and administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug
product.”40 The second method is a result of “changes being effected”
(CBE) regulations and may be done upon the manufacturer filing a supplemental application.41
2.

The FDA’s Changing Opinion

Along with implementing regulations created by Congress, federal
agencies often create regulations or rules that have preemptive effect.42
Because an agency is uniquely qualified to evaluate the effect of regulations
on state law, an agency’s views are usually entitled to deference.43 Prior to
2006, the FDA’s official position was that state tort suits were meant to
complement federal regulations in providing greater consumer safety.44 In

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 28, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249)
[hereinafter Brief of the Chamber of Commerce].
37. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
38. Id.
39. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(a) (2008). See also Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
40. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2008). See also Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
41. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2008). See also Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
42. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) (“Federal
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes” as long as the agency administrator does not exceed his or her authority or act contrary to congressional approval).
43. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996); United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
44. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202-03; Brief of Amici Curiae Former FDA Commissioners Dr.
Donald Kennedy and Dr. David A. Kessler in Support of Respondent at 2-4, Wyeth v. Levine, 129
S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of Former FDA Commissioners] (stating state
law enhanced consumer safety—the goal of federal regulation—because state tort suits brought
information to light which was unknown to the FDA, state tort suits created an incentive to drug
manufacturers to make risks known, and state tort suits provided compensation for victims which
was not provided by federal law).
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2006, the FDA declared, in a preamble to the FDCA, that the FDCA establishes both a floor and a ceiling on labeling requirements, so FDA approval
of a label preempts state law or state common-law actions that conflict with
or contradict its judgment.45 The FDA’s 2006 preamble also declared that
state-law failure to warn claims threaten the FDA’s role as an expert agency
charged with the responsibility of evaluating and regulating drugs.46
Whether the FDA was correct in stating its authority or whether it really
only created minimal requirements was contested in Levine and in courts
around the nation.47
B. GENERAL PREEMPTION
Conflicts of law in the federal system are resolved through the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which declares federal
law must remain supreme.48 The existence of federal drug regulations
raises the preemption question in state tort suits.49 However, the preemption defense was rarely successful in blocking state common law personal
injury and products liability claims until the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992
decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.50 The preemption defense is
premised on the assertion that a particular federal regulation forecloses an
inconsistent state law regulation or state products liability judgment.51 The
existence of preemption often depends upon the claim for relief.52
Preemption analysis usually begins with “the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal
Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”53
Preemption defenses may be expressly provided for.54 Preemption may

45. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1200. This floor and ceiling argument means the FDA’s
determinations were conclusive on both the minimum and the maximum warnings allowed on
labels. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 11.
46. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.
47. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249).
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
49. See LITIGATING TORT CASES § 60:30 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano
eds. 2003).
50. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (No. 901038). The Petitioner noted preemption of a state personal injury action, where federal law
provided no alternative remedy, had never once been successful until the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled Cipollone’s claims were preempted. Id. at 4.
51. DAVID G. OWEN, JOHN E. MONTGOMERY & MARY J. DAVIS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
SAFETY 372 (Foundation Press 5th ed. 2007).
52. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (clarifying the difference between the jury’s verdict that
the warning was insufficient, rather than demanding a particular warning that eliminated IV-push
altogether).
53. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
54. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516-18.
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also be implied in federal laws and regulations through field preemption or
conflict preemption.55 Wyeth argued the defense of implied conflict preemption in the Court.56 Implied conflict preemption includes both an
“impossibility” test57 and a “purposes and objectives” test.58 Both the
impossibility and the purposes and objectives test depend upon a finding
that federal and state laws actually conflict.59
C. IMPLIED CONFLICT PREEMPTION
State law is impliedly preempted by federal law and regulations where
state and federal law actually conflict, even if preemption was not expressly
provided.60 State law is “created” through jury verdicts because judgments
essentially create a requirement for which a defendant must comply in order
to escape liability, and so state tort suits may be preempted by federal regulations.61 Federal regulations created by agencies may have the same
preemptive effect as congressional action if Congress has given the agency
the authority to create regulations with preemptive force.62 Regulations
preempt state law if they either make compliance with both federal regulations and state law impossible or if the state law stands as an obstacle to the
purposes and objectives of Congress.63
1.

Congressional Intent

Congress’s purpose in enacting a statute or regulation is the “ultimate
touchstone in every pre-emption case.”64 Congressional intent is presumed
55. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230-31. Field preemption occurs where a federal scheme is so
pervasive in a particular area or field that a court may reasonably assume Congress did not intend
to allow state law to supplement the federal laws in that field. Id. at 230. Wyeth, previously
known as American Home Products, Inc., argued field preemption at the trial level, but conceded
in the Vermont Supreme Court that field preemption did not exist in this case. Levine v. Am.
Home Products, Inc., No. 670-12-01, 2004 WL 5456809 (Vt. Super. July 30, 2004); Levine, 129
S. Ct. at 1192.
56. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1192.
57. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
58. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 n.20 (1941)).
59. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000). The difference in
the implied preemption approaches is not legally significant but is only a “terminological wedge.”
Id.
60. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153.
61. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992). See also Geier, 529 U.S. at
882 (stating the Court’s preemption cases assume state tort judgments require compliance, so state
tort judgments may actually conflict with federal laws or regulations).
62. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54.
63. Id. at 153.
64. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). Contrarily, Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion in Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., “It is not our job to speculate upon congressional motives.” 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009
(2008).
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to exist where Congress created a law that actually conflicts with state law
or where Congress vested a federal agency with the authority to create
regulations that conflict with state law.65 The scope of any preemption
provision depends upon the congressional purpose derived from statutory
language, the statutory framework, and the structure and purpose of a
statute.66 A state jury verdict can conflict with federal regulation merely if
it upsets congressional objectives.67 The strength of a regulation is essential
in an implied conflict preemption analysis.68
2.

Federal Agency Authority

One way Congress creates preemption of state law is through federal
agencies and federal regulations.69 Federal regulations have the same preemptive effect as federal statutes.70 A federal agency does not need to
make an express statement identifying a conflict in order for preemption to
apply as long as there is an actual conflict.71 An agency’s interpretation of
a law’s preemptive effect is given deference “when it [is clear] Congress
delegated the authority to an agency to make rules carrying the force of
law . . . .”72
An example of an agency with the authority to promulgate regulations
with the force of law can be found in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
Inc.73 In Geier, the Department of Transportation’s interpretation of the
regulations at issue was given great deference because Congress delegated
the authority to the Department “to implement the statute; the subject matter
[was] technical; and the relevant history and background [were] complex
and extensive.”74 The agency was thus “uniquely qualified” to interpret the
regulations and determine their preemptive effect.75 Similarly, Congress
expressly granted the FDA the authority to implement the provisions of the
Medical Device Act and exempt state regulations from the Act’s

65. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54.
66. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485-86.
67. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000).
68. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 681, for the
proposition that the Court “has recognized an agency regulation with the force of law can preempt conflicting state requirements”).
69. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54.
70. Id.
71. Geier, 529 U.S. at 884-85.
72. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (discussing the Chevron
deference).
73. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
74. Geier, 529 U.S. at 883.
75. Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996)).

414

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:405

preemptive effect.76 The FDA was “require[d]” to assess the preemptive
effect of the Act, and the Court’s opinion in Lohr was “informed” by the
FDA’s determination.77 However, the Court has also suggested that
changing agency positions may be entitled to less deference.78 Thus, it may
be difficult to determine whether certain agencies have authority to create
preemptive regulations or whether agency opinions may be ignored.
3.

Savings Clauses

Another unclear area of pre-Levine conflict preemption jurisprudence
involves the effectiveness of savings clauses.79 Congress will sometimes
draft federal safety statutes with a savings clause, which expresses in some
manner the legislation is not intended to replace state tort suits, but instead
“saves” them.80 The purpose of a savings clause is to ensure an injured
plaintiff has a private remedy under the law.81 However, a savings clause
does not always preserve state tort remedies against an implied conflict
preemption challenge.82
For example, the Court in Geier determined the express preemption
provision read with the savings clause required a narrow reading of the
preemption clause so that a significant number of common law liability
cases would be saved.83 However, the savings clause did not bar the possibility that implied conflict preemption may block common law liability.84
The savings clause did not suggest intent to save state tort causes of action
that conflicted with federal regulations.85 A savings clause may operate to
save common law actions where federal regulation creates a floor or
minimum requirement on manufacturers’ duties.86 The regulations in Geier
were not subject to the savings clause because saving common law suits
would upset the purposes and objectives of federal regulations that constituted both a floor and a ceiling on what manufacturers could do.87
76. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495-96.
77. Id.
78. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008). The Court mentioned changing
agency positions may be entitled to less deference in passing because it was clear in Riegel what
the express preemption clause meant. Id.
79. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869-74 (holding a savings clause ineffective).
80. OWEN, MONTGOMERY & DAVIS, supra note 51, at 373.
81. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002).
82. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74.
83. Id. at 868. The clause stated compliance with a federal safety standard did not provide an
exemption from common law liability. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).
84. Id. at 869.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 870.
87. Id.
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Presumption Against Preemption

The presumption against preemption was another uncertain piece of
conflict preemption jurisprudence after the Geier decision because it went
unmentioned.88 Normally, both express and implied preemption analyses
begin “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”89 The presumption against preemption
applies with “particular force” where Congress acts in areas constituting the
traditional police powers of health, safety, welfare, and morals.90 Therefore, courts should avoid applying preemption if a piece of federal legislation has more than one possible meaning.91 Dissenting Justices often argue
the presumption against preemption should only apply when determining
whether preemption exists, but the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated
the presumption applies when determining the scope of preemption as
well.92 The presumption against preemption is intended to maintain the
historic primacy of state regulations in health and safety concerns.93
The United States Supreme Court clarified the conflict preemption
doctrine in Levine, regarding agency authority, the presumption against
preemption, and savings clauses.94 The Court appears to have tightened
conflict preemption tests, making them more difficult to plead. The Court’s
decision will likely demand a detailed analysis of an agency’s history and
authority before a state tort suit will be preempted in an area which the state
has traditionally occupied.
III. ANALYSIS
In Levine, Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.95 The majority
88. See Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U.
PITT. L. REV. 181, 211 (2004) (discussing the Court’s opinion in Geier, which said the savings
clause and the express preemption provision did not create a special burden on the defense of
presumption, causing commentators to suggest the presumption was irrelevant). Wyeth argued in
its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari the presumption does not apply when the area at issue has a
history of significant federal presence. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 24.
89. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
90. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (citing Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 458 (1996)).
91. Id. (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)).
92. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545-46 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
93. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. State law may be preempted even if a federal law or regulation
affects health or safety concerns. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008)
(holding the Medical Device Amendment (MDA) barred many state tort suits on medical devices).
94. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-1204 (2009).
95. Id. at 1190.
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held Levine’s claims were not preempted because it was not impossible for
Wyeth to comply with both FDA regulations and the state verdict.96 The
majority also held preemption did not apply because Congress’s objectives
were to create greater consumer safety by the FDA regulations complementing state verdicts.97 The majority reasoned that Congress provided a
way for manufacturers to remain responsible for drug labels and that
Congress did not grant the FDA authority to declare preemption on its
own.98 Justice Breyer joined the majority and filed a concurring opinion in
Levine.99 Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment and filed an
opinion.100 Justice Alito dissented and filed an opinion, in which Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia joined.101
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The existence of the implied preemption defense depends upon the
claim for relief.102 The jury verdict found Wyeth negligent and Phenergan a
defective product due to insufficient warnings and instructions.103 Significantly, the jury found Wyeth had a duty to provide a sufficient warning but
did not demand the warning be replaced by another warning.104 The Court
focused simply on whether an inadequate warning claim was preempted,
rather than on whether a state could mandate a certain warning or proscribe
certain uses.105 A jury verdict mandating contraindication of the IV-push
method, in spite of the FDA’s decision that IV-push was safe, may have
resulted in a different decision by the Court.106 The majority opinion
focused on the cornerstones of preemption, conflict preemption based upon
impossibility, congressional purposes and objectives in enacting laws and
regulations, and the continued importance of state tort suits in drug warning
label safety.

96. Id. at 1199.
97. Id. at 1202-04.
98. Id. at 1197-98, 1201.
99. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 1204-17 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 1217-31 (Alito, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 1194 (Levine’s claim may have asked for a ruling that IV-push be prohibited,
but the appealed verdict only found the label inadequate).
103. Id. at 1193.
104. Id. at 1194.
105. Id. Wyeth argued Levine’s claim should be preempted because Levine apparently
argued Phenergan’s label should foreclose IV-push injection altogether before the trial court.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 2.
106. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (noting the FDA chose not to contraindicate IV-push
administration, so a jury verdict mandating contraindication likely would directly conflict with the
FDA’s specific ruling).
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The Cornerstones of Preemption

The Court’s analysis began with the cornerstones of preemption: the
supremacy of Congressional purpose and the presumption against preemption.107 In Levine, the presumption against preemption applied because
state tort suits have always been available for consumers injured by defective drugs.108 Health and safety are traditionally state law issues, so the
presumption against preemption applies to protect state interests from being
“cavalierly” preempted by federal law.109 The dissent argued the presumption against preemption did not apply in implied conflict preemption, but
the majority of the Court made clear the presumption does apply in implied
conflict preemption analyses.110 The mere existence of the FDCA was not
enough to overcome the presumption against preemption.111
The Congressional purpose in enacting and amending the FDCA has
always been to protect consumers from harmful products and fraudulent
marketing.112 The Court determined the FDCA’s provision that state law
would only be invalidated upon a “direct and positive conflict” with the
FDA was a savings clause.113 Congress increased the FDA’s powers over
time, but Congress also enacted the savings clause, and state tort suits
continued.114 Congress consistently rejected enacting express preemption
provisions, gave manufacturers the duty to prove their labels were adequate,
and rejected a provision that would require the FDA to pre-approve all
changes to drug labels.115 Congress also failed to provide remedies for
injured consumers through the FDCA.116 The Court determined Congress
did not provide a federal remedy because it intended state law to continue to
provide remedies to injured consumers.117 The Court considered these
factors as proof Congress never intended to remove the manufacturer’s duty

107. Id. at 1194-95.
108. Id. at 1195 n.3.
109. Id.
110. Id. The dissent noted the Geier Court “specifically rejected” the presumption against
preemption. Id. at 1228. One commentator noted the Levine decision brought the “fabled”
presumption “back in vogue.” David G. Savage, Business Downturn, A.B.A. J., May 2009, at 21.
111. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3.
112. Id. at 1195.
113. Id. at 1196. The opposing argument was that the “savings clause” was an attempt to
preserve conflict preemption of state tort suits, not to save state tort suits from preemption. Brief
of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 36, at 28.
114. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
115. Id. at 1196. The Court specifically noted Congress enacted an express preemption
provision for medical devices but did not do the same for drugs. Id.
116. Id. at 1199. This “lack of federal remedy” assertion was argued and denied in
Cipollone. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 27.
117. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1199-1200.
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to create and maintain safe labels.118 While keeping the cornerstones of
preemption in mind, the Court turned to the conflict preemption tests:
impossibility and congressional purposes and objectives.119
2.

Conflict Preemption Based Upon Impossibility

The Court denied Wyeth’s argument that Levine’s claims were preempted because it was not impossible for Wyeth to comply with the FDA’s
requirements and Wyeth’s manufacturer duties under state law.120 The
court declared that impossibility is a demanding defense.121 Wyeth argued it
was impossible to comply with the state verdict because it could not change
the warning without FDA approval of a supplemental application.122
However, the Court reasoned drug manufacturers retained their common
law duties to warn, CBE regulations made it possible for Wyeth to comply
with federal regulations and common law duties, and Wyeth would not
have been guilty of “misbranding” if Wyeth made changes to make the
label safer.123
First, the Court determined the CBE regulations allowed Wyeth to
“‘add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction’ or to ‘add or strengthen an instruction’” if it would make use of the
product safer.124 Wyeth could strengthen the label upon discovering newly
acquired information consisting of new information of risks and data or new
analyses of previously submitted data.125 Wyeth could have changed
Phenergan’s label upon discovering the risk of gangrene from IV-push
administration was more frequent or severe than previously known.126
Wyeth had the ability and knowledge to make changes before FDA
approval, as long as Wyeth filed a supplemental application with the FDA
upon making any changes.127

118. Id. at 1199.
119. Id. at 1196-1204.
120. Id. at 1196-97.
121. Id. at 1199.
122. Id. at 1196-97.
123. Id. at 1196-99.
124. Id. at 1196.
125. Id. at 1196-97 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2008)). A 2008
amendment allows a manufacturer to utilize the CBE method only if the new warning is based on
“newly acquired information.” Id. Though the CBE regulations were created after Levine’s 2007
injury, the Court determined the “newly acquired information” amendment still gave Wyeth the
ability to change Phenergan’s warnings. Id. at 1197.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1196.

2010]

CASE COMMENT

419

Wyeth argued the CBE regulations did not allow Wyeth to change
Phenergan’s label.128 Wyeth’s argument was based on prior FDA consideration of the risks of IV-push administration.129 Wyeth argued the FDA had
adequate prior knowledge of the risks of gangrene due to IV-push administration, and the agency responded.130 Therefore, according to Wyeth, any
information Wyeth received of IV-push incidents was not “newly
acquired.”131 The Supreme Court disagreed and accepted Levine’s prior
incident evidence, indicating Wyeth could have done more to make
Phenergan’s label regarding the IV-push method safe.132 Wyeth “could
have” analyzed subsequent incidents and added a stronger warning.133
Therefore, it was not impossible for Wyeth to change Phenergan’s label to
make it safer regarding the risks of IV-push administration while still
complying with the FDA’s requirements.134
Second, the Court also rejected Wyeth’s contention that changing the
label would have constituted misbranding or unauthorized distribution and,
therefore, subjected it to liability.135 Unauthorized distribution occurs
where a new drug lacks an effective application with the FDA and is
distributed.136 Complying with the jury’s verdict and making the warning
stronger would not have made Phenergan a new drug without an effective
FDA drug application.137 Misbranding assumes the label is adequate and
changes would make the label inadequate, however a stronger warning
would have likely made Phenergan more adequate.138 Further, the FDA
does not have the authority to unilaterally determine a drug is misbranded.139 The Court also found it difficult to believe the FDA would
bring an action against Wyeth for making Phenergan’s label safer under the
CBE regulations.140

128. Id.
129. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 6-8.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 6-8. See also Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1199 (giving the history of the FDA’s
consideration on IV-push administration and citing the lower court’s ruling that the label the FDA
rejected was only different from, but not stronger than, the prior label).
132. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1197.
133. Id. The Court also disregarded Wyeth’s argument the FDA still had to approve the
changes eventually because eventual required approval did not make it impossible for the
manufacturer to strengthen the label. Id.
134. Id. at 1196-97.
135. Id. at 1197.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Federal juries determine whether a drug is misbranded. Id.
140. Id.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court made clear manufacturers are responsible for the adequacy of the initial warning label and
remain responsible for the continuing adequacy of the label while a drug is
on the market.141 Wyeth could not claim it did not have a duty to ensure the
label was safe merely because the FDA determined the contents of the label
were adequate before the drug made it to market.142 The Court examined
the history of drug manufacturers’ duties throughout the existence of the
FDA and noted manufacturer duties were retained.143 Ultimately, Wyeth
had a duty to ensure Phenergan’s label was safe, and Wyeth could not prove
an adequate warning was impossible to achieve under both federal and state
law due to the CBE regulations.144 Beyond conflict preemption based on
impossibility of compliance with both state and federal law, state tort suits
may also be preempted where state suits conflict with congressional
purposes and objectives in creating federal laws and regulations.145
3.

Conflict Based on Congressional Purposes and Objectives

Wyeth’s preemption defense was also rejected under the purposes and
objectives test because Congress was seeking to make drugs safer through
the years, and state tort suits actually help achieve congressional goals.146
Wyeth used the Court’s analysis from Geier, arguing Congress’s purpose
was to grant the FDA complete authority in determining drug warning
labels because it was an expert agency capable of striking a balance between competing objectives.147 Wyeth’s position, supported by the 2006
preamble to the FDCA, was that the FDCA creates both a floor and a
ceiling on drug regulation and that the FDA’s approval of a drug label was
conclusive.148
The Court rejected Wyeth’s arguments, stating Congress never provided a federal remedy for consumers harmed by drugs, which could only
mean Congress intended state tort law remedies to remain intact for injured
consumers.149 The Court noted Congress was aware of state tort suits when
it created the FDCA and amended the Act throughout its existence.150
141. Id. at 1197-98.
142. Id. at 1198. The Court recognized new risks are discovered over time and after drugs
have already made it to the market. Id. at 1197.
143. Id. at 1198.
144. Id.
145. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
146. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1199.
147. Id. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 46.
148. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1199; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 3.
149. Id. at 1199-1200.
150. Id.

2010]

CASE COMMENT

421

Congress created an express preemption clause regarding medical devices
in the Medical Device Amendment (MDA) but did not do the same in the
FDCA.151 Congress chose to remain silent on preemption even though
Congress was aware of the “prevalence of state tort litigation,” which
evidenced Congress’s intent for FDA regulations to be bolstered by state
tort suits instead of displacing state suits.152
The FDA is charged with determining whether a drug is safe and
effective and whether the drug’s labels are adequate before the drug can go
on the market, but it does not mean Congress’s purpose in creating the
agency was also to remove the manufacturer’s common law duties.153
Wyeth argued the FDA must have balanced the risks and benefits of
Phenergan’s label proposals presented to it, and therefore state law would
contradict FDA approval, as stated in the 2006 Preamble.154 However,
Congress did not provide the FDA with the authority to declare the
preemptive effect of the FDCA, and Congress’s purpose was only to create
a floor for regulations on which state verdicts could build.155
The Court in the past has examined an agency’s views of preemption
although the Court denied giving deference to an agency’s conclusions.156
The Court unequivocally stated it still does its own conflict analysis and
does not simply accept an agency’s conclusions.157 Federal agency views
may be given “weight” regarding the interplay between state tort law and
agency regulations because agencies do have special knowledge and understanding of how the regulations actually work.158 How much weight the
Court gives these opinions depends on the thoroughness, consistency, and
persuasiveness of the agency’s explanation.159 The Court has given “substantial weight” to the FDA’s views on the preemptive effect of the MDA
but the Court did not do the same in Levine.160
151. Id. at 1200.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1201. Commentators previously noted the FDA did have the authority to create
preemptive regulations but had not done so. OWEN, MONTGOMERY & DAVIS, supra note 51, at
394.
156. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
157. Id. at 1200-01. The Court’s statements on an agency’s authority to declare preemptive
effects have been interpreted by some courts to mean an agency’s explanations, but not agency
conclusions, may be given deference. Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1214
(9th Cir. 2009).
158. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
159. Id.
160. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (discussing the expertise of the
FDA in determining the preemptive effect of the MDA and giving substantial weight to the FDA’s
view of the MDA).
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The Court rejected the FDA’s 2006 preamble statements.161 First, the
FDA’s prior views were its regulations only created a floor and that state
tort law could add to the regulations, providing greater consumer protection.162 In its proposed rulemaking in 2000, the FDA stated it would not
make a rule implying state tort suits would be preempted.163 However, the
FDA proceeded to do the opposite in the 2006 preamble with a strong view
its regulations preempted state law.164 More importantly, the FDA’s new
position was contrary to congressional views and objectives already decided
by the Court.165 The FDA, therefore, did not have the necessary authority,
nor did it have consistent opinions in order for the Court to give any weight
to the FDA’s statements.166
4.

The State Tort Suit Advantage Over Federal Regulation

The Court’s decision in Levine favors state tort suits for protecting
consumers. Prior to the 2006 preamble, the FDA considered state law tort
suits to be “complementary” to drug regulations.167 The Court supported
state law tort remedies, noting product safety is increased when manufacturers are subject to state tort suits.168 The Court supported its statements
on the advantage of state tort suits with traditional products liability
rationales, including increased safety incentives for manufacturers, remedies for injured plaintiffs, and increased consumer confidence.169
Several amici briefs provided evidence of how overworked and
understaffed the FDA is and enumerated many FDA “failures” in keeping
unsafe products off the market.170 Manufacturers who administer the
studies on their drugs have greater access to study results and continue to
receive information on the safety and effectiveness of drugs on the market;
161. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
162. Id. at 1202.
163. Id.
164. Id. The Court called the FDA’s adoption of preemption language in the preamble, after
stating it would not adopt preemption, a procedural failure. Id.
165. Id. The Court stated Congress gave the FDA the authority to determine the preemptive
effect of regulations in the MDA in 21 U.S.C. § 371(a), but it did not do the same through the
FDA. Id.
166. Id. at 1201-02.
167. Id. See generally Brief of Former FDA Commissioners, supra note 44, at 7 (discussing
the FDA’s prior views on state tort suits and preemption).
168. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
169. Id. at 1202-03.
170. See, e.g., Brief of DES Action as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 14,
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249); Brief of Former FDA Commissioners, supra note
44, at 17, 23-24; Brief of New England Journal of Medicine Editors and Authors as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 6-7, Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief
of New England Journal of Medicine Editors and Authors].
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the FDA often relies on information from manufacturers.171 With 11,000
drugs on the market, the FDA does not have the resources to discover all
the risks in drugs premarket or on-market.172 State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards, motivate manufacturers to provide for greater safety,
and compensate victims who otherwise would have no remedy.173 The
majority opinion ruled in favor of greater consumer remedies rather than
174
out of concern for drug manufacturers.
The separate opinions, on the other hand, show conflict preemption
175
issues are far from settled.
Justice Breyer highlighted areas where preemption may still exist.176 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, in
which he questioned the implied conflict preemption tests the Court uses—
which he thinks “wander far” from what the U.S. Constitution requires—
and declared the impossibility test too narrow and the purposes and
objectives test too broad.177 In his dissent, Justice Alito came to the
opposite conclusion of the majority on many issues and would have ruled in
the manner Justice Thomas fears.178
B. JUSTICE BREYER’S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion.179
Justice Breyer stated state tort law did not conflict with a federal regulatory
scheme in Levine but stressed FDA regulations may bear the force of
law.180 Justice Breyer noted state tort law may “interfere with the FDA’s
desire to create a drug label containing a specific set of cautions and
instructions.”181 Justice Breyer expressed the FDA should be allowed to
determine when state torts suits are preempted based on Congressional
purposes and objectives.182 Justice Breyer was also concerned about the
rising prices of drugs if state tort suits were allowed to continue unabated,
which was a popular argument from pro-business groups who wanted to
171. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202; Brief of New England Journal of Medicine Editors and
Authors, supra note 170, at 8, 10.
172. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 n.11. See also Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538,
545 n.6 (2008) (discussing that overburdened agencies charged with regulating an “enormous
amount of activity” should not be the exclusive source of regulation).
173. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1204-31.
176. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 1205-09 (Thomas, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 1217-31 (Alito, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1190.
180. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring).
181. Id.
182. Id. Justice Breyer failed to state why he thinks the FDA has this authority. See id.
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take the burden of a common law duty off manufacturers.183 Justice
Breyer’s concurrence focused on possibilities where preemption may still
exist in suits similar to Levine’s.
C. JUSTICE THOMAS’S CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT
Justice Thomas did not approve of the implied preemption tests the
Court has crafted over the years.184 First, Justice Thomas repeated and
expanded upon his often-stated disagreement with the purposes and
objectives conflict preemption jurisprudence.185 Justice Thomas argued
Congress’s purposes and objectives were “potentially boundless” and that
“musings . . . do not satisfy the Art. I, § 7 requirements for enactment of
federal law.”186 Justice Thomas wrote “the purposes and objectives [of]
pre-emption jurisprudence is inherently flawed” because it looks at the
unwritten purposes and objectives of hundreds of individuals comprising
Congress.187 Justice Thomas would look to the law Congress actually
makes, as the supremacy clause requires, rather than atextual notions or
congressional inaction.188
Justice Thomas also questioned the majority’s adoption of the “physical impossibility” standard and asked for an explanation of why this is the
precise standard.189 Justice Thomas argued “[t]here could be instances
where it is not ‘physically impossible’ to comply with both state and federal
law, even when the state and federal laws give directly conflicting commands.”190 However, Justice Thomas did agree there was no direct conflict
in Levine’s case because there are no regulations stating an FDA-approved
label must remain in force without ever being changed, although he said the
majority opinion may lead to “freewheeling” evaluations.191 Justice
Thomas’s opinion noted the same conflict preemption cases may lead to
different and even opposite conclusions.192 Justice Thomas stated he “can
no longer assent to a doctrine that pre-empts state laws merely because they
183. Id. at 1204.
184. Id. at 1205.
185. Id. Justice Thomas wrote, “Under this approach, the Court routinely invalidates state
laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or
generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal
law.” Id. Justice Thomas believes the tests the majority uses are inconsistent with the Constitution. Id.
186. Id. at 1207.
187. Id. at 1211.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1209.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1211, 1217.
192. Id. at 1213-15 (citing the use of Geier by the majority and the dissent).
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‘stan[d] as an obstacle’” to the purposes and objectives of Congress.193
Justice Thomas believed the majority opinion gave “improperly broad preemptive effect to judicially manufactured policies[,]” but the dissent came
to the opposite conclusion that the majority “undermine[d] . . . broader preemption jurisprudence and the broader workability of the federal druglabeling regime.”194
D. JUSTICE ALITO’S DISSENT
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia joined Justice Alito’s dissent.195 The dissent began by stating Levine’s claim was simple medical
malpractice and should not have constituted an insufficient warning claim
against the manufacturer at all.196 The dissent relied on the FDA’s judgments regarding the safety and effectiveness of drugs, regardless of whether
the FDA’s decisions were wise.197 Instead of applying the presumption
against preemption, the dissent would have allowed a state tort suit here
only if the FDCA expressly allowed it.198 Likewise, the dissent said the
FDA did set the floor and the ceiling on labeling requirements.199 The
dissent argued the FDA only set minimum standards if the FDCA expressly
allowed, which was opposite of the majority’s decision that the FDA set
minimum standards unless stated otherwise.200 The dissent read the clause,
which the majority determined to be a savings clause, as merely
recognizing the existence of conflict preemption, as in Geier.201
The dissent argued the majority opinion in Levine turned “yesterday’s
dissent into today’s majority opinion.”202 The dissent compared the FDA to
the Department of Transportation in Geier by declaring the FDA struck a

193. Id. at 1217.
194. Id. at 1217, 1222.
195. Id. at 1190. Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts later recused himself in Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010), because he owned stock in Pfizer, Inc., and Pfizer acquired Wyeth
in late 2009. Tony Mauro Comment to The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times, Roberts Recuses in
New Wyeth Case, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/03/roberts-recuses-in-wyeth-case.html
(Mar. 8, 2010, 13:06). Reportedly, Chief Justice Roberts did not recuse himself in Wyeth v.
Levine because the merger had not yet taken place. Id. See also Justice Robert’s Portfolio, WASH.
POST, Feb. 23, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/22/
AR2009022201649.html.
196. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1217-18.
197. Id. at 1218.
198. Id. at 1219. Justice Alito also stated the presumption is irrelevant in conflict preemption
analysis after Geier and questioned the “long-standing” nature of the presumption. Id. at 1228-29.
199. Id. at 1221.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1227.
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sensitive balance in its determinations, which should not be upset.203
Further, the dissent did not find a difference between the express
preemption clause of the FDA and what it argued was the implied
preemptive effect of the FDCA.204 Justice Alito further wrote the FDA’s
preamble did have the force of law because other FDA decisions have the
force of law.205 In general, the dissent expressed great distaste for allowing
jury verdicts where a federal agency regulates.206
The dissent argued juries are “ill-equipped” to determine the costbenefit balance of warning label safety.207 The dissent stated the Court
erred by concluding the FDA had not adequately considered the risks of IVpush.208 Further, the dissent read the jury verdict as requiring the manufacturer to contraindicate IV-push in disregard of the FDA’s decision not
to.209 The dissent disagreed with most of the jury’s findings, noting
Phenergan’s label contained sufficient warnings against the very risk at
issue.210 Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion determined state tort claims like
Levine’s could not coexist with the FDA’s determinations because the
FDA’s original decision found Phenergan’s label safe while the Vermont
jury found Phenergan’s label unsafe regarding the risks of IV-push
administration.211
IV. IMPACT
The Court clarified points of contention in Levine. First, courts may
use the absence of express preemption as evidence Congress did not intend
for implied preemption to exist.212 The presumption against preemption is
more important than it appeared to be after Geier.213 The Levine Court was
also more lenient than the Geier Court in reading statutory language as an
effective savings.214 The Court ensured the preemption defense will be
difficult to plead where there is any available possibility of complying with
both federal and state law.215 The purposes and objectives test is not so
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
(2000).
215.

Id. at 1221, 1227.
Id.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1229-30.
Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id. at 1226-27.
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1194-95.
Compare id. at 1196, with Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 868
Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1198-99.
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broad because congressional silence was interpreted as Congress not
intending preemption to exist and preemption not fitting with the purpose of
the FDCA and FDA regulations.216
The Court’s decision in Levine also places a heavy burden on federal
agencies desiring preemption of state tort suits.217 Agencies must first be
given the authority by Congress to declare the preemptive effect of
regulations, and then agencies must actually create preemptive regulations
with the force of law because mere opinions do not suffice.218 An agency
will not be presumed to have balanced the risks and benefits that create
preemptive regulations.219 Specifically for the FDA, the MDA and the
FDCA have different preemptive effects, even though the FDA implements
both acts.220 After Levine¸ conflict preemption analyses should require
detailed and specific findings on all regulations and agencies.
The differing opinions in Levine show there are issues left to be settled.
Three members of the Court still oppose the use of the presumption against
preemption and would use a somewhat reverse presumption in favor of
federal agencies.221 Justice Thomas is adamantly opposed to the conflict
preemption tests the Court uses and enumerated many weaknesses and
uncertainties in conflict preemption principles.222 The resulting uncertainties on conflict preemption tests, savings clauses, presumptions, and
agency authority suggest each preemption claim will require an individualized and specific analysis in order to determine if preemption does in fact
exist. The Court is still split on whether the FDA has the ability to create
preemptive regulations.223 Further, the Court specifically did not answer
whether a jury verdict mandating a particular warning would be preempted,
as the Levine Court only said a verdict finding a label unsafe is not
preempted.224 Subsequent cases have proven there are other resulting
225
questions after Wyeth v. Levine.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 1199-1200.
Id. at 1201-04.
Id. at 1200-01.
Id.
Id. at 1200 (noting the MDA has an express preemption provision, but the FDCA does

not).
221. See id. at 1220 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that when the FDA determines a drug is
safe, no state may countermand the FDA’s determination).
222. See id. at 1209, 1211 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that “physical impossibility” may
not be the best standard and that the purposes and objectives test is inherently flawed).
223. See id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1228 (Alito, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 1194.
225. See infra Part IV.A.
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A. IMPACT ON SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS
The Levine decision has been called a “sea change” in preemption
analysis.226 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opined Levine restored
conflict preemption to its pre-2001 form.227 A federal district court noted
the Supreme Court had been moving away from finding conflict preemption
based on alleged conflicts with purposes underlying federal regulations
even before Levine.228 A state court determined the Geier decision has been
specifically limited since Levine provides that conflict preemption based on
agency regulation exists only where “there is an extensive contemporaneous
history, and detailed agency explanations.”229 In particular, Levine contradicts several prior cases that gave preemptive effect to the FDCA’s
preamble.230 Wyeth v. Levine has already resolved conflict preemption
claims for several courts with suits based on similar facts and claims as
Levine.231 Levine answered important questions in the “tens of thousands of
individual claims, and potentially millions of class actions claims” pending
in federal and state courts where plaintiffs claimed FDA-approved labels
were defective.232 Further, the Supreme Court vacated judgment in
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,233 a preemption case similar to Levine, and
remanded the case back to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals after
Levine.234
Levine strengthened certain principles in conflict preemption jurisprudence. Courts have found a “renewed emphasis” on the presumption
against preemption.235 Precedent not applying the presumption may be

226. Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 2010).
227. Id. at 391.
228. Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1207-08
(D.N.M. 2010). President Barack Obama issued a memorandum to federal agencies discouraging
the creation of preemption. See Tenuto v. Lederle Labs., No. 1134/81, 2010 WL 625223, at *7-8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 2010).
229. Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., 680 S.E.2d 77, 94 (W. Va. 2009).
230. Brockert v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 287 S.W.3d 760, 766 (Tex. App. 2009).
231. Mason, 596 F.3d at 396; Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (W.D.
Okla. 2009); Aaron v. Wyeth, No. 2:07cv927, 2010 WL 653984, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2010).
232. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 12-14. Footnote four of the Petition
directed attention toward several class action suits with thousands of members. Id. at 14 n.4.
Wyeth stated the individual suits were “too numerous to count.” Id.
233. 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009).
234. Colacicco, 129 S. Ct. at 1578-79. The Third Circuit had previously determined the
presumption against preemption applied with minimal force, the brand and generic drug claims
were impliedly preempted, and the FDA’s preamble statements were entitled to deference.
Colacicco, 521 F.3d 253, 285 (3d Cir. 2008). Further, the United States retracted its amicus brief
for Colacicco after Levine. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 443 (5th Cir. 2010).
235. Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1208 (D.N.M.
2010); Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the presumption, but still
holding conflict preemption existed).
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called into question.236 The presumption applies in any field where there is
a history of state law regulation, even if there is also a history of federal
regulation.237 Further, courts have applied the interpretation that disfavors
preemption where there were two possible interpretations of the preemptive
effect of regulations.238
Lower courts have relied on the Court’s assertion that state tort suits
and manufacturer duties remain important where federal regulations exist
but federal remedies do not.239 The absence of a federal remedy for injured
plaintiffs has served as evidence for courts that Congress did not intend a
federal law or regulation to preempt state law or lawsuits.240 Additionally,
some courts have determined the absence of express preemption provisions
is further proof that Congress did not intend for implied preemption.241
Those courts have specifically looked at an agency’s explanation when
examining the possible preemptive effect of regulations, but did not rely on
agency conclusions on whether regulations have preemptive effect.242
Agency positions on the preemptive effect of regulations seem entitled to
“interpretational deference” only where clearly consistent with
congressional intent and where the agency has not waivered on its
interpretation.243
Courts have also decided drug manufacturer defendants cannot prove
implied preemption unless the defendants can prove through “clear evidence”244 the FDA would not have accepted stronger or better warnings.245

236. N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 603 F. Supp. 2d 715, 721 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
237. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 178 (1st Cir. 2009).
238. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1225; Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334
(3d Cir. 2009).
239. Aaron v. Wyeth, No. 2:07cv927, 2010 WL 653984, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2010).
240. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc.,
588 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating Congress’s purpose was not to shield manufacturers
from tort liability for private parties without other remedy); Dorsett v. Sandoz, 699 F. Supp. 2d
1142, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (noting Levine shows the congressional purpose behind the FDCA
was not to shield manufacturers from liability).
241. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d at 174-75; Holk, 575 F.3d
at 337. One court accepted Justice Thomas’s concurring statements that congressional “musings”
should not preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Herrera, 690 F.
Supp. 2d at 1226.
242. Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1214 (9th Cir. 2009).
243. Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 950 (9th Cir. 2010).
244. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1198 (2009) (stating “absent clear evidence that
the FDA would not have approved a change” the Court will not conclude it was impossible to
comply with both federal and state requirements).
245. Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 395 (7th Cir. 2010); Mensing, 588
F.3d at 611; see also Demahy, 593 F.3d at 435 (stating mere “uncertainty about the FDA’s
response makes federal preemption less likely”).
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The clear evidence requirement has been called “demanding.”246 In one
case, the clear evidence requirement was not met where the FDA examined
data on risks but did not change a warning label because failure to act still
did not prove the FDA clearly would have rejected stronger warnings.247 In
another case, even where the FDA rejected some of the plaintiff’s suggested
warnings, the plaintiff’s remaining claims were not preempted because the
claims included other warnings not specifically rejected by the FDA.248
Likewise, the clear evidence requirement was held not met where the FDA
rejected a warning but the manufacturer acquiesced and made no further
attempt to ensure the warning label was safe.249 Defendant manufacturers
can no longer claim state tort requirements are preempted just because a
federal agency did not mandate a certain warning, because failure to mandate does not mean the warning clearly would have been rejected by a
federal agency.250
The Levine decision has been applied to cases outside of drug manufacturing claims. The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)
208, which was at issue in Geier, where FMVSS 208 preempted a state
lawsuit, was found not to preempt claims in a defective vehicle suit where
the vehicle did not have side airbags.251 The defendant claimed conflict
preemption based on the purposes and objectives of FMVSS 208, but the
court determined a suit on side impact airbags actually furthered the
purposes and objectives of FMVSS 208.252 The rationale behind Geier did
not apply because FMVSS 208 did not contain a side airbag requirement.253
Further, the particular and specific scheme at issue in Geier relied on
balancing the risks and benefits of airbags and the same scheme was not “in
effect” for the alleged defective vehicle in this case.254 The district court

246. Mason, 596 F.3d at 393 (noting the FDA’s decision against using proposed warnings
was not considered “clear evidence” the FDA would have rejected stronger warnings).
247. Forst v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954 (E.D.Wis. 2009)
(observing the FDA did not prohibit all enhanced warnings, nor did it preclude changes of specific
labeling elsewhere).
248. See Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharms., 682 F. Supp. 2d 662, 678 (N.D.
Tex. 2010) (noting the plaintiffs’ claim would have been preempted if limited only to the failure to
specifically warn of possible side effects of Motrin, but the plaintiffs’ claims included the failure
to warn of the symptoms of side effects, and therefore preemption did not exist because the FDA
had not rejected a warning on the symptoms).
249. Aaron v. Wyeth, No. 2:07cv927, 2010 WL 653984, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2010).
250. Dorsett v. Sandoz, 699 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
251. Durham v. County of Maui, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151 (D. Haw. 2010) (denying
summary judgment for the defendant).
252. Id. at 1158.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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determined FMVSS 208 set only minimum standards and applied the
presumption against preemption.255
Geier was distinguished in another case where the plaintiff claimed the
warnings in a vehicle’s owner’s manual regarding airbags were insufficient.256 There, the court determined FMVSS 208 established only the
minimum standard for warnings on airbags.257 FMVSS 208 had a preemptive effect in Geier because manufacturers were given specific options and
the plaintiff’s suit in Geier would have “foreclosed” those options.258 An
agency may require certain warnings, but if the agency does not forbid
additional warnings, then a manufacturer may still have a duty under state
law that may be enforced by a state court.259
The Court’s rationale in Levine has been applied outside of products
liability lawsuits, where a federal district court determined state law consumer protection statutes on advertising may complement federal law just
as state common law duties may.260 An implied preemption defense was
denied where the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) had extensive regulations but states also exercised police powers to regulate or
prohibit telecommunications that harm citizens.261 Another district court
determined Levine’s provision that state law may be preempted by an agency regulation with the force of law applied to express preemption challenges as well.262 The “demanding” physical impossibility test has been
applied to deny a preemption defense by a national securities exchange
registered with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding
claims based on an assault on the floor of the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange.263
However, the Levine decision was not extended to a design defect
claim where the plaintiff claimed the drug Redux was an “unreasonably
dangerous drug for which no warning would have been adequate[,]” even
though it had been approved by the FDA.264 The court distinguished Levine
first because Levine was a failure to warn claim, and the present claim was
255. Id. at 1158-59, 61. FMVSS 208 set both a “floor and a ceiling” in Geier but not in
Durham, which supports the conclusion that courts must make detailed and specific
determinations regarding the preemptive effect of regulations. See supra Parts II.C.2, III.A.3.
256. Cook v. Ford Motor Co., 913 N.E.2d 311, 324-25 (Ind. App. 2009).
257. Id. at 325.
258. Id. at 324.
259. Id. at 325.
260. See In re Bayer Corp. Combination Aspirin Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 701
F. Supp. 2d 356, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
261. Palmer v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231-32 (W.D. Wash. 2009).
262. Rooney v. Philadelphia, 623 F. Supp. 2d 644, 664 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
263. See Dooner v. DiDonato, 971 A.2d 1187, 1200 (Pa. 2009).
264. Longs v. Wyeth, 621 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507-09 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
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not.265 Further, Levine focused on the manufacturer’s duties after a drug
was on the market, and the present claims were based on the manufacturer’s
duties before market approval.266 The court upheld the order of summary
judgment in favor of the drug manufacturer, Wyeth, because the plaintiff’s
design defect claims were based on pre-FDA approval duties, federal law
preempted such claims, and the plaintiff neglected to provide evidence to
refute the defendant’s evidence that the drug label warnings were adequate
as a matter of law.267
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the presumption against
preemption in a suit against Sallie Mae for fraudulent misrepresentations in
billing statements and coupon books, but still held the claims were preempted.268 Conflict preemption existed where the relevant agency’s position was “in harmony” with congressional intent, so the agency was entitled
to deference.269 Further, the agency had no “dramatic change” in position
regarding the preemptive effect of its regulations, so its opinion was not
viewed with the same suspicion as the FDA’s in Levine.270 The court still
conducted an independent review in compliance with Levine, but the court
ultimately agreed with the agency’s interpretation and accorded deference
to the agency’s opinion.271
Levine was followed with a split in the federal circuits regarding
whether generic drug warning claims are preempted.272 Some courts
determined claims against generic drug manufacturers are still preempted,
in part because those courts determined CBE regulations do not allow
manufacturers to change warning labels without FDA approval.273 Other
courts decided that after Levine, conflict preemption is not a defense for
generic drug manufacturers.274 One court noted generic drugs “ride the

265. Id. at 509.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 506.
268. See Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 950 (9th Cir. 2010).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Stacel v. Tera Pharms., USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
273. Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., 672 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2009). However,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the FDA previously expressed in a footnote to the CBE
regulations that generic drug manufacturers could not use CBE regulations, but the FDA has since
removed the footnote. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 443-44 (5th Cir. 2010).
274. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 436-49; Bartlett v. Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 279,
305 (D.N.H. 2009); Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:09CV210RJCD, 2009 WL 4670637, at *3
(W.D.N.C. Sep. 30, 2009); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (D. Vt. 2009); Stacel, 620
F. Supp. 2d at 906. Levine has also been applied to deny a conflict preemption defense for an
over-the-counter drug manufacturer. Valdes v. Optimist Club of Suniland, Inc., 27 So. 3d 689,
691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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coattails” of brand name drugs.275 First, the federal regulations about generic drugs do not address post-FDA approval modifications to warnings.276
However, generic drug manufacturers must at least initiate label changes.277
Second, CBE regulations do not forbid generic drug manufacturers from
changing warning labels if the changes are meant to make the drug safer.278
Third, Levine supports a conclusion that generic drug manufacturers have a
duty to ensure warning labels remain safe because generic drug regulations
specifically do not prohibit manufacturers from directly warning or requesting the FDA to warn doctors of newly discovered risks.279 Finally, the
FDCA’s purposes and objectives, which the Court subscribed to in Levine,
apply as much to generic drugs as they do to brand name drugs.280 After
Levine, courts seem reluctant to rely on FDA opinions and prior amicus
briefs that endorse preemption of claims against generic drug manufacturers.281
B. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA LAW
Wyeth v. Levine affirmed that manufacturers owe a duty under state
laws to maintain the safety and effectiveness of their labels.282 Although
Levine provides opportunities for residents in every state to seek remedies
despite the existence of federal regulations, North Dakota’s products
liability law is not well-settled.283 Plaintiffs seeking recovery under North
Dakota law must also overcome a rebuttable presumption against defects.284
The presumption a product is free from defects exists where warnings and
instructions for a product are in conformity with government standards.285
Despite Levine, North Dakota law seems unfavorable to a plaintiff claiming
a defective product due to warnings and instructions which have been
approved by the FDA.
However, North Dakota suits may still implicate the Levine analysis.
The pre-Levine confusion was exemplified in a federal case from the

275. Munroe v. Barr Labs., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302-03 (N.D. Fla. 2009).
276. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 436, 444.
277. Id. at 437-38; Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 608-09 (8th Cir. 2009).
278. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 440-41.
279. Id. at 444-45; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 608-09.
280. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 448-49.
281. Dorsett v. Sandoz, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
282. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1197-98, 1202 (2009).
283. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-07(2) (1995) (providing the “problems with the current
civil justice system” were codified along with the need for reform).
284. § 28-01.3-09.
285. Id.
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District of North Dakota. The Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc.286 decision
agreed that the FDCA “‘smacks’ of preemption,” yet the law was not “cut
and dried.”287 The district court ended its discussion by concluding it could
not determine the MDA and the FDA were actually different or that preemption did not apply to the plaintiffs’ strict liability and negligence claims
regarding the drug Adderall’s label.288 The court decided preemption might
apply because the FDA dictated the contents of Adderall’s label, and the
court found the manufacturer was prohibited from changing the label
without the FDA’s approval.289 The court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant manufacturer on the court’s shaky preemption
stance, as well as other theories.290 Levine and changes in the FDCA do not
support the court’s reasoning, and the Ehlis decision should not be cited as
precedent because the court found no difference between the FDCA and the
MDA, and the court did not recognize the manufacturer’s duty to amend
defective warning labels.291 However, the Ehlis plaintiff’s proposed “black
box” warning, a particular warning surrounded by a black box on the label,
may still be preempted after Levine because the FDA may have already
rejected that particular warning.292
V. CONCLUSION
In Levine, the United States Supreme Court toughened the implied
conflict preemption test in areas of the law traditionally regulated by states
by applying the presumption against preemption.293 The Court reiterated
congressional purpose is still the ultimate touchstone in finding conflict
preemption.294 An impossibility defense under conflict preemption is difficult to assert because it must be absolutely impossible for a defendant to
have complied with both the federal and state regulations in order to claim

286. 233 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.N.D. 2002). The father of a five-week-old girl killed the
infant after taking the drug Adderall. Ehlis, F. Supp. 2d at 1190. He alleged Adderall caused
psychosis and sued the drug manufacturer in part because the drug’s warning label did not warn
about this effect. Id. at 1190-91.
287. Id. at 1197.
288. Id. at 1198.
289. Id.
290. Id. The court granted summary judgment because of the learned intermediary doctrine.
Id.
291. See generally Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (making extremely detailed findings and
rejecting similar preemption claims).
292. See id. at 1194 (declining to answer whether a verdict mandating a particular warning
was preempted—though it should be noted the plaintiff Levine did originally request a specific
warning).
293. See supra Part III.A.1.
294. Id.
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the defense.295 The mere presence of the FDA and the FDCA do not prove
Congress’s purposes and objectives were to vest a federal agency with
exclusive authority over the safety and effectiveness of drug labels.296
Ultimately, drug manufacturers retain responsibility to ensure their labels
are safe and effective, and merely using an FDA-approved label may be
insufficient to provide a conflict preemption defense.297 Congress intended
the FDA’s regulations to be supplemented by state tort suits rather than be
preemptive of such suits.298 Finally, the FDA cannot unilaterally declare
state tort suits are preempted.299
*
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295. See supra Part III.A.2.
296. See supra Part III.A.3.
297. Id.
298. See supra Part III.A.4.
299. Id.
*2010 J.D. with distinction from the University of North Dakota School of Law. Thank you
to Paul LeBel for inspiring this article.

